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Abstract—We consider cyber-physical systems (CPSs) com-
prising a central controller that might be replicated for high-
reliability, and one or more process agents. The controller
receives measurements from process agents, causing it to compute
and issue setpoints that are sent back to process agents. The im-
plementation of these setpoints causes a change in the state of the
controlled physical process, and the new state is communicated
to the controllers through resulting measurements. To ensure
correct operation, the process agents must implement only those
setpoints that were caused by their most recent measurements.
However, in the presence of replication of the controller, network
or computation delays, setpoints and measurements do not
necessarily succeed in causing the intended behavior. To capture
the dependencies among events associated with measurements
and setpoints, we introduce the intentionality relation among
such events in a CPS and illustrate its differences with respect
to the happened-before relation. We propose a mechanism,
intentionality clocks, and the design of controllers and process
agents that can be used to guarantee the strong clock-consistency
condition under the intentionality relation. Moreover, we prove
that our design ensures correct operation despite crash, delay,
and network faults. We also demonstrate the practical application
of our abstraction through an illustration with a real-world CPS
for electrical vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
We consider cyber-physical systems (CPSs) comprising
software agents, namely controllers and process agents (PAs),
that coordinate, as shown in Fig. 1, to maintain a physical
process in a desirable state. A PA is a software agent that
interfaces with sensors and actuators, and controls a sub-
process. The controller receives measurements from PAs,
computes and issues setpoints that are implemented by the PAs
through actuators. The communication network might drop,
delay, reorder or retransmit messages. The controller, being
susceptible to crash and delay faults, is a single point of failure
and is usually replicated for high-reliability. The same general
architecture of CPSs is considered in recent papers [1]–[6].
On implementation of a setpoint by a PA, the state of the
sub-process is altered and the new state is communicated
to the controller via a measurement. The controller uses
these measurements to recreate the new state of the entire
process that it then uses to compute setpoints. The setpoints
computed with this state are only valid as long as the recreated
state reflects the actual state of the process. Any subsequent
setpoint implementations change the process state, making
the former setpoints unsafe for implementation. Therefore,
to achieve the desired control, the state of the process at
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Fig. 1. CPS architecture with a central controller and one or more PAs
the time of setpoint implementation must be the same as
that used by the controller for computing the corresponding
setpoints. Thus, before implementing a setpoint, the PA must
be able to ascertain whether the setpoint reflects the state it last
advertised. In other words, it must be able to infer if a received
setpoint was caused by the measurement it last advertised.
Similarly, a controller must be able to ascertain if a measure-
ment received from a PA represents the most recent-state of
that sub-process or the state corresponding to earlier setpoint-
implementations. This causal relationship can be better under-
stood using the notion of control rounds. Software agents must
be able to attribute a round number to received messages, to
compare it with the round number they are currently executing,
and to treat the message appropriately.
Note that, we use the term “state of the process” as a proxy
for the state of the PAs. While the state of the physical process
is continuous and evolving, the state of the PAs is discrete
and only changes upon a setpoint implementation. In real-
time control, the CPS issues setpoints at a rate faster than the
dynamics of the underlying process. Thus, the evolution of the
state of the process between two setpoint implementations is
minimal, thereby justifying our usage of the term.
B. Need for a New Relation
When the controller is replicated, assigning a consistent
round number to events requires consensus between the repli-
cas. Due to network losses and delays, and due to software
faults, consensus might require unbounded time [7], making
it unsuitable for real-time systems such as CPSs.
In literature, this problem is circumvented by using message
labels (that represent the causal order between the messages)
to infer the round number. The causal order between the
messages is derived using the happened-before relation [8].
In the presence of replication of the controller, or random
network or computation delays, messages that intend to cause
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Fig. 2. Illustration of why the happened-before relation is not suitable for
ordering events in a CPS in the presence of replication
a certain effect do not necessarily succeed, due to competing
messages. This is illustrated through the example in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, the controller is replicated, and its two replicas
C1 and C2 receive the measurement M0 sent by the PA.
This measurement is used by each replica in the computation
of a setpoint, resulting in SP1 and SP ′1 in C1 and C2,
respectively. In such a scenario, SP1 and SP ′1 belong to
the same “generation” or the same “control round”, and are
said to be equivalent. SP1 is received by the PA, and its
implementation results in M1. However, due to a delay at C2,
M1 is received before SP ′1 is issued. Although M1 can be
said to have happened before SP ′1, M1 is nonetheless caused
by an equivalent of SP ′1, namely SP1.
In the previous example, we say that SP ′1 intends to have
caused M1, but it did not succeed because a competing
equivalent event (SP1) was received earlier. In order to for-
mally capture this phenomenon, we introduce the intentionality
relation. This relation enables an implementation that provides
a solution to the ordering problem.
C. Contributions
First, in Section III, we describe an abstraction of CPSs
with one, possibly replicated, central controller, and one or
more local PAs. This abstraction models the execution trace
of a CPS by using two inherent relations: (1) the networking
relation used to represent message exchange and (2) the
computation relation used to represent the computation by
software agents.
Second, in Section IV, we formally define the intentionality
relation (→, read intends) by using the networking relation
and the computation relation. We also give an intuition
for competing events and formally define this notion under
the name, intentional equivalence. Moreover, we show that
physical time, on its own, is inadequate in providing strong
clock-consistency under the intentionality relation [8]. In other
words, if physical time is used to timestamp and to order
events a and b, where TS(a) is the timestamp of event a,
then TS(a) < TS(b) 6⇔ a→ b.
Third, in Section V, we describe a mechanism, intentionality
clocks, that uses logical clocks to attribute a round number
to messages and can be used to guarantee strong clock-
consistency under the intentionality relation. We formalize
the desired behavior in terms of two correctness properties:
safety and optimal selection. These properties specify which
messages can be used in computation by software agents, and
which can be discarded. We present the design of a controller
and a PA that use intentionality clocks to guarantee these
correctness properties. All guarantees are formally proven.
Lastly, we demonstrate a practical case study of the concepts
developed throughout the paper by using, as an example, a
real-world CPS for real-time control of electric vehicles (EVs)
[4]. We analyze their design in the light of the intentionality
relation and show that when the controller is replicated, it
violates the optimal selection property. Consequently, the CPS
can enter a deadlock situation which can be avoided by using
the CPS design that we proposed.
II. RELATED WORK
Here, we summarize the different bodies of work that ad-
dressed the problem of ordering events in distributed systems,
and we note their shortcomings with respect to the intentional-
ity relation. The detailed discussion of the shortcomings, along
with examples, can be found in Sections I-B, IV-E and V-A.
We also relate the CPS design we presented to other CPS
designs found in literature.
Ordering events in distributed systems is traditionally done
through a causal order, captured by the happened-before
relation [8]. Providing a causal order adheres to what is
referred to as the real-time causal consistency semantic [9].
This is achieved through one of several mechanisms such as
timestamps, Lamport clocks [8], or vector clocks [10].
As previously mentioned (Section I-B) causal order and the
happened-before relation fail to capture the inherent “round
number” in CPSs. Therefore, we introduce the intentionality
relation. We elaborate, in Section IV-E, on the issues that pre-
vent physical time and timestamping-based labeling schemes
from guaranteeing the strong clock-consistency condition un-
der the intentionality relation.
Lamport clocks and vector clocks are complementary under
the happened-before relation, as Lamport clocks describe this
relation, and vector clocks infer it. Intentionality clocks use
a scalar clock inspired from Lamport clocks. In Section V-A,
we discuss the differences between intentionality clocks and
Lamport clocks in greater detail. Vector clocks were not
considered as an avenue because they only provide a partial
ordering between events in general distributed systems, as not
all labels are comparable.
We use the same model of the CPS as previous work [1]–[5],
with a central, possibly replicated, controller and several PAs.
Some previous works that use the same model [2], [4] assume
the existence of a labeling scheme to achieve their goal. By
providing one such labeling scheme in Section V-A, this paper
complements the existing work in CPS design. We explore
the CPS design in [4] in greater detail in Section VI; and
we show that our system model, formalism, and mechanism
apply to such a system. We also expose the possible issues in a
naive extension of its design, which arise when the controller
is replicated, and that can be avoided with our CPS design.
Several industrial solutions circumvent the ordering problem
by using frameworks, such as the time-triggered architecture
3(TTA) [11], which provide synchrony guarantees. However,
using such frameworks requires specialized hardware, in ad-
dition to a complete redesigning of the application to fit the
framework. In contrast, we propose a solution that requires
neither. This facilitates deployment in existing CPSs.
III. CPS MODEL
In this section, we describe the model of the CPS we
consider for defining the intentionality relation and for de-
signing intentionality clocks. CPSs consists of four types of
software agents: sensors, actuators, controllers and PAs. We
consider CPSs with one central controller and one or more
PAs, as shown in Fig. 1. The sensors and actuators interact
with the physical process, by reading and altering its state,
respectively. The software agents, namely controller and PAs,
together achieve the desired control of the physical process.
This model of the CPS is in agreement with the general model
of CPSs considered in literature [1]–[6], and applies to a wide
range of applications such as real-time control of smart grids,
autonomous vehicles, and manufacturing processes.
PAs are low-level software agents responsible for control-
ling a sub-process, i.e., one part of the controlled process. PAs
interface with the sensors and actuators as shown in Fig. 1.
They implement the setpoints received from the controller
through their actuators, read the state of the resources through
sensors and send them as measurements to the controller. The
number of PAs in a CPS is a constant and each PA is denoted
with a unique identifier.
A controller performs high-level control of the physical
process by receiving measurements from PAs and by sending
setpoints to PAs.
We consider crash and delay faults [1] in all the software
agents, namely controller and PAs. Byzantine faults are not
considered. Being a single point of failure, the controller
is often replicated for high-reliability. We assume that the
PAs are not replicated. Hence, a software agent is either a
controller replica or a (non-replicated) PA. All replicas of the
controller have different identifiers. Furthermore, we assume
that the communication network between the software agents
might drop, delay, reorder or duplicate messages. Byzantine
contamination of messages is not considered.
We abstract the execution of a CPS as a trace of events
occurring on different software agents. We define three types
of events that can occur on a software agent: sending event,
reception event, and timeout event. When software agent A
sends a message to agent B, we say that A experiences a
sending event. Upon successful reception of the message by
B, we say that B experiences a reception event. Whereas,
if the message is lost or is delayed beyond a deadline, B
experiences a timeout event. A timeout event could also be
caused by the internal logic of a software agent, such as firing
of a timer (as seen in Section VI) or a response to system
state.
An event is represented by the 4-tuple (sa, pa,m, l) where
(1) sa is the identifier of the agent on which the event occurs,
(2) pa is the identifier of either the PA on which the event
occurred, or the PA for which the event is intended, (3) m is
the message encapsulated in the event, and (4) l is an event
label given by the software agent on which the event occurs.
For sending or reception events, the encapsulated message is
the measurement or setpoint exchanged, and timeout events
encapsulate ⊥, representing the absence of a message.
Let C, P be the set of identifiers of all controller replicas and
PAs, respectively. Then, the set of identifiers of all software
agents is S = C ∪ P . Let M be the set of all messages such
that ⊥∈M, and L be a partially ordered set of labels. Then,
we denote the set of all events that occur in an execution
trace by E ⊂ S × P ×M× L. No two distinct events have
the same 4-tuple (sa, pa,m, l). Furthermore, we require that
the abstract labeling scheme used to obtain L ensures that
labels of events occurring on the same software agent, for the
same PA, are different. In practice, such a labeling of events is
achieved through physical timestamps, a permanent sequence
numbering scheme, Lamport clocks [8], Vector clocks [10],
etc. Also, for CPSs that do not implement any labeling
mechanism on events, the model still applies by successively
numbering all events of each software agent with increasing
integers.
Sending events are considered as output events, as they are
the output of a computation at a software agent. Reception and
timeout events are considered input events1. The set of input
events E i, which includes reception and timeout events, and
the set of output events Eo, which includes sending events,
are such that E = E i ∪ Eo and E i ∩ Eo = ∅. Note that, due
to network retransmissions, a single output event can result in
different input events at the same PA, as each of these input
events will have different labels l.
We consider the following computation model of a con-
troller. In each computation, the controller uses exactly one
input event from each PA and produces exactly one output
event for each PA. Moreover, when the controller computes
by using timeout events for one or more PAs, it is able to
appropriately account for the missing information that it would
have received from the corresponding reception events. Else,
the controller refrains from computation of setpoints until
more reception events occur (measurements are received).
To bootstrap the CPS, we assume that a controller starts
with p sending events, one for each PA. These events are called
initial sending events. The set of all initial sending events is
represented by I.
IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN EVENTS IN A CPS
In this section, we formalize the notion of intentionality, an
intrinsic relation between events in a CPS which captures the
order between measurements and setpoints. First, we define the
sub-relations that constitute intentionality, namely, the network
relation and the computation relation. Then, in Section IV-C,
we define an equivalence relation between events, called as
intentional equivalence. Finally, we define the intentionality
relation in Section IV-D.
For a relation r−→ and an event a, we denote by r(a) and
r−1(a) the image and pre-image of a by r−→, respectively.
1This dichotomy of input-output events is similar to that of sending-
receiving events used in classic distributed systems literature. We use a
different name because we also have timeout events in our model.
4A. Network Relation
Software agents exchange messages using a communication
network. Thus, a network relation ( n−→) exists between events
at different agents. This relation maps an output event (sending
event) at one agent to an input event (reception/timeout event)
at another agent. Formally, we abstract the properties of a
network relation as follows.
Definition 1 (Network Relation). n−→ is a network relation, iff
n−→⊂ Eo × E i and
• for any a ∈ Eo, there exists b ∈ E i s.t.
1) a n−→ b, b.pa = a.pa, and n−1(b) = {a}
2) If a.sa ∈ C, then b.sa = a.pa
3) If a.sa ∈ P, then b.sa ∈ C
• for any b ∈ E i, there exists a ∈ Eo s.t. n−1(b) = {a}
Intuitively, a n−→ b if a is a sending event and b is its
corresponding reception event or the corresponding timeout
event that occurs on the intended destination. Notice that for
a sending event that occurs on a controller, the corresponding
input event occurs on a PA, and for a sending event that occurs
on a PA, the corresponding input event occurs on a controller.
B. Computation Relation
A computation performed by a software agent can be repre-
sented as a mapping from a set of input events to a set of output
events. In each computation, a controller uses p measurements,
one from each PA and computes p setpoints, one for each PA.
Upon reception of a setpoint, a PA implements it through the
actuator, then reads the state of the sensor and sends the new
state as a measurement. The set of input events used by a PA
for computation is a singleton set. We abstract the properties
of a computation relation ( c−→) as follows.
Definition 2 (Computation Relation). c−→ is a computation
relation, iff c−→⊂ E i × Eo
1) for any a ∈ E i
a) If a.sa ∈ P , then ∃b ∈ Eo : a.sa = b.sa,
a.pa = b.pa, c(a) = {b}, and c−1(b) = {a}
b) If a.sa ∈ C, then
• ∀ i ∈ P, ∃! b ∈ c(a) : b.pa = i
• ∀ b ∈ c(a), b.sa = a.sa
• ∀ b, b′ ∈ c(a), c−1(b) = c−1(b′)
• ∀ b ∈ c(a), ∀ i ∈ P, ∃! a′ ∈ c−1(b) : a′.pa = i
2) for any a ∈ Eo \ I, there exists b ∈ E i s.t. b.pa = a.pa
and b ∈ c−1(a).
C. Intentional Equivalence Relation
In the presence of controller replication and message re-
transmission, certain events that occur in the same “control
round” in a CPS are functionally the same, i.e. they steer the
physical process to a similar state. The intentional equivalence
relation (≡) captures this.
We list the properties that will be used to define this relation.
The intentional equivalence relation is defined as the smallest
relation satisfying the following properties.
1) If a and b are the initial sending events at controller
replicas, and a.pa = b.pa then a ≡ b
2) If a n−→ b and a n−→ c, then b ≡ c
3) If a ≡ a˜, a n−→ b and a˜ n−→ c =⇒ b ≡ c
4) If a c−→ b, a c−→ c and b.pa = c.pa, then b ≡ c
5) If a ≡ a˜, a c−→ b, a˜ c−→ c and b.pa = c.pa =⇒ b ≡ c
The intuition behind rule (1) is that initial sending events are
computed without any knowledge of the state of the system.
They are polling events and do not steer the system in any
direction. Thus, those sent to the same PA are equivalent.
For rule (2), the underlying intuition is that reception
events and their corresponding timeout events convey similar
information to the controller, as do multiple reception events
corresponding to the same sending events (i.e., retransmis-
sion). A reception event informs the controller of the state of
the process, whereas the corresponding timeout event forces
the controller to estimate the missing state before computation.
Recall from Section III that, when a controller of a CPS
computes using timeout events, it accounts for the missing
information, in order to ensure correctness. Thus, reception
events and corresponding timeout events are equivalent.
From Definition 2, there exists a single output event re-
sulting from a computation relation for each PA. Rule (4)
states that if an event causes, after computation, two events
for the same PA, then the resulting events are equivalent.
In fact, the resulting events are the same event, and are
therefore equivalent by the reflexive property of the intentional
equivalence relation (Theorem IV.1). Finally, rules (3) and (5)
mean that equivalent events, when subject to the same relation,
result in equivalent events.
To better understand the intuition behind equivalent events
resulting in similar changes to the state of a CPS, consider
a controller that receives partial information from its PAs.
A well-designed controller would compute only if it can
reconstruct the missing information from the partially received
information, thus resulting in safe setpoints. For example, a
controller with two PAs, one with a 1 Hz update rate and
another with a 10 Hz update rate, would require a measurement
from the latter every 100 ms, whereas from the former only
once every 1 s as it knows that the state of the slow PA has
not changed during that second. Thus, a timeout event on the
measurement from that PA is equivalent to a reception event.
Events that result from retransmissions encapsulate the same
message verbatim, and are thus deemed equivalent. In the
presence of replication, however, different replicas might send
different sets of setpoints in a given “control round”. This
might be due to different sets of measurements received, a
different internal state, or a non-deterministic computation.
In other words, CPS equivalent events can be different and
can lead to different outcomes. Therefore, in practice, CPSs
must be able to live with this. This can be done, for instance,
with an agreement on input as shown in our companion work,
Quarts [2]. Alternatively, this is achieved if the setpoints are
idempotent and the CPS logic permits such deviations [12].
The following theorem states that the intentional equiva-
lence is, indeed, an equivalence relation.
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Fig. 3. Difference between temporal order and intentionality due to replication
of the controller
Theorem IV.1. “Intentional equivalence” is reflexive, sym-
metric and transitive.
D. Intentionality Relation
We define the intentionality relation (→), where a → b
is read as “a intends b”, by using the relations defined in
the previous sections. It is the smallest relation satisfying the
following properties:
1) If a n−→ b, then a→ b
2) If a n−→ b and a˜ ≡ a, then a˜→ b
3) If a c−→ b, then a→ b
4) If a c−→ b and a˜ ≡ a, then a˜→ b
5) If a→ b and b→ c, then a→ c
Based on these properties, the following theorems hold.
Theorem IV.2. For any two events a, b: a→ b =⇒ b 6→ a.
Theorem IV.3. For any two events a, b, such that a.pa = b.pa:
(a 6→ b ∧ b 6→ a) ⇐⇒ a ≡ b.
The proofs of Theorems IV.1, IV.2, and IV.3 are not cen-
tral to the discussion, and are thus not included for spatial
consideration. We discuss them further in Appendix C.
Let Ep = {e ∈ E|e.pa = p}. Recall that Ep/≡ represents
the factorization of the set Ep by the relation ≡. Then, as
a consequence of Theorem IV.3, the intentionality relation
induces a total order on Ep/≡, for any p ∈ P . In other words,
the intentionality relation induces a total order on any set of
events concerning the same PA and belonging to different
equivalence classes.
In Section V, we use the definition of intentionality to
formally specify the desirable correctness properties of a CPS.
We also present a CPS design and prove that it guarantees the
said properties.
E. Intentionality and Physical Time
In this section, we answer the question “Is physical time
sufficient to guarantee the strong clock-consistency condition
under the intentionality relation?”
As CPSs are real-time systems, they generally keep track
of physical time. To maintain synchronized global time on
all software agents, their physical clocks are synchronized ei-
ther using GPS-based clock-synchronization or network-based
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Fig. 4. Difference between temporal order and intentionality due to delays
clock-synchronization (e.g., PTP [13], NTP [14]). These time-
synchronization solutions provide a synchronization accuracy
δ that ranges from sub-microsecond to one millisecond.
CPSs often leverage the availability of synchronized phys-
ical clocks to reason about the temporal ordering of events.
However, as we will see in the following examples, the tem-
poral ordering of events does not coincide with intentionality.
Consider a CPS with two controller replicas and a single
PA, as shown in Fig. 3. We will consider a perfect time-
synchronization (δ = 0). Here, a → b, a ≡ a˜ =⇒ a˜ → b.
However, the time of occurrence of the effect b, is less than
that of the “cause” a˜.
Another example emphasizing the difference between tem-
poral order and intentionality, shown in Fig. 4, concerns a
CPS with one non-replicated controller and two non-replicated
PAs. Due to network delay, the reception event b2 occurs
on PA2 much later than the reception event b1 at PA1. As
a result, the reception event d1 from PA1 occurs much earlier
than the corresponding reception event d˜2 from PA2. Instead,
the controller moves on with a timeout event d2 for PA2.
Consequently, the events e1, f1, g1 and h1 take place. Then,
we have a2 → d2 → e1 → h1. But, d2 ≡ d˜2 =⇒ d˜2 → h1.
However, on the controller, the time of occurrence of h1
occurred is less than that of d˜2. Therefore, as the correct
temporal order is h1 before d˜2, it does not coincide with
intentionality.
Hence, we conclude that on their own, physical clocks are
not sufficient to reason about intentionality and require an
additional mechanism to do so. In Section V-A, we present a
mechanism that describes the intentionality relation by using
logical clocks instead of physical clocks. Note that, such a
mechanism does not require synchronized physical time.
V. CPS DESIGN
As discussed in Section I, the controller and PAs must
ensure that the events used in their computation reflect the
most recent state of the process. The state of the process
changes with each setpoint implementation, i.e., a computa-
tion event by a PA. Thus, when a controller uses an input
event e : (sa1, pa1,m1, l1) and there exists another event
e′ : (sa1, pa1,m2, l2) such that e→ e′, then the message m2
reflects a more recent state of the sub-process controlled by
PA1 than the message m1. If the controller uses the “old”
event e in the computation of setpoints, then the resulting
6setpoints might not be compatible with the most-recent state
of the process, thereby causing incorrect control of the CPS.
Definition 3 formally specifies the safety property that the
software agents in a CPS must satisfy in order to guarantee
correct control.
Definition 3 (Safety). If a software agent uses an event a for
computation, then the last sending event b that occurred on
this software agent, where b.pa = a.pa, is such that b→ a.
The safety property requires that (1) a PA must use only
those events in computation that have accounted for its most
recent state, captured by its last measurement sending event,
and (2) a controller must use only those events in computation
that reflect the state change caused by its last setpoint sending
events.
Notice that discarding all messages can trivially satisfy the
safety property. However, this will render the physical process
uncontrolled by a complete loss of availability of the control.
Therefore, the selection of events must be optimal, i.e., only
those events that violate the safety property must be discarded.
This property is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Optimal Selection). An event a must only be
discarded if there exists another event b, such that b 6→ a
that: (1) occurred on this software agent, or (2) this software
agent was informed that b occurred on its replica.
The first part of the optimal selection property, on its own,
states that an event a must be accepted by a software agent
if the last sending event b on this software agent intended to
cause a. Recall that if b→ a, then all events that occurred on
this software agent before b also intend to cause a. Thus, a
presents new information, i.e., information about the state of
the process after the implementation of the last-sent setpoint.
In the presence of replication, however, an event that was
intended by the last sending event, does not necessarily present
new information, as seen in the following example.
A controller replica that last computed in round l might
receive two measurements from the same PA: one from round
l+1 and another from round l+2, before it is ready to compute.
This can occur due to another controller replica driving the
CPS into round l+2. In this scenario, the first controller might
ignore the message from round l+1 as the message from round
l + 2 supersedes it. The controller will, therefore, compute
using reception events from round l + 2, and declare timeout
events for PAs from which it has not received measurements
from that round. This condition is captured by the second part
of the optimal selection property.
Next, we describe the design of a CPS in which the software
agents satisfy the safety and optimal selection properties.
Our design uses a label scheme, intentionality clocks, that
is adapted from Lamport clocks to guarantee strong clock-
consistency under the intentionality relation. We describe the
design of intentionality clocks in Section V-A; and the design
of controllers and PAs that use the intentionality clocks in
Sections V-B and V-C, respectively. We present the formal
guarantees in Section V-D.
A. Intentionality clocks
Intentionality clocks is a mechanism to maintain, update
and synchronize logical clocks across all software agents in a
CPS. It is adapted from the Lamport clocks abstraction that
was designed for general distributed systems, to accommodate
the specificities of events in CPSs.
Each agent maintains and updates a local logical clock
that is used to set the event label of sending events on that
agent. These labels are communicated along with the message
encapsulated in the event and are used to obtain the event
labels of the corresponding reception and timeout events.
The labels are assigned such that they guarantee the strong
clock-consistency condition [8]. In other words, for two
events a and b, we say that a clock mechanism describes
the intentionality relation if the event labels are such that
a.l < b.l =⇒ a → b and a.l = b.l =⇒ a ≡ b. We
say that the clock mechanism infers the intentionality relation
if a→ b =⇒ a.l < b.l and a ≡ b =⇒ a.l = b.l. The strong
clock-consistency condition is satisfied if a clock mechanism
both describes and infers the intentionality relation.
The design of intentionality clocks is given by the following
rules (for details, see Sections V-B and V-C):
1) The event label of a sending event at an agent is the value
of its logical clock, right before the sending event.
2) If a is a sending event and b is its corresponding
reception or timeout event, then b.l = a.l + 1.
3) The logical clock of an agent is only incremented before
a computation. It is never decremented.
4) The logical clock of delayed software agents is resyn-
chronized using the labels of the received events.
There are two main distinctions in the design of inten-
tionality clocks when compared to Lamport clocks [8]. First,
in our solution, the logical clock at an agent is incremented
only when the agent performs a computation. This enables the
controller to infer the intentionality relation by using its local
logical clock, and to have a notion of the “control round”. In
contrast, the Lamport clock at an agent is updated after every
event that occurs at that software agent Thus, the agents lose
the information required to infer the intentionality relation and
to have a notion of the “control round”.
Second, in intentionality clocks, the label of a reception
event is one more than the label of the corresponding sending
event. In contrast, in Lamport clocks, for a reception event b
that occurs when the value of the logical clock of the agent is
C is b.l = max(a.l, C) + 1, where a is the corresponding
sending event. Due to the presence of delayed controller
replicas or message retransmissions by the network, reception
events from previous “control rounds” might have a higher
label than reception events from current “control round”.
Consequently, it cannot describe or infer the intentionality
relation, i.e., cannot guarantee the strong clock-consistency
condition.
The formal guarantees of intentionality clocks are presented
in Section V-D and proven in the Appendix.
7B. Controller Design
Algorithms 1 and 2 describe the design of a controller
with intentionality clocks; this design satisfies the safety and
optimal selection properties. The model of the controller is
the same as that used in our previous work [1], [2]. The parts
in red are our modifications for satisfying the aforementioned
properties (together with the implementation of Algorithm 3).
Each controller maintains a logical clock C, a list of input
events (i.e., reception and timeout events) Z, and a list of their
corresponding event labels L.
Upon receiving a measurement from a PA, the controller
declares a reception event with a label one more than the label
of the received message (Algorithm 1, line 9). The controller
adds the measurement to Z, and adds the label of the reception
event to L.
The controller also occasionally checks if it has accumulated
enough information about the state of the physical process,
through the measurements, required to compute setpoints. To
this end, it uses the ready_to_compute() function. We
make no assumptions on this function or the frequency with
which the controller invokes it. The controller can choose to
start a computation of setpoints by considering any form of
information provided by measurements from Z. Moreover, the
labels in L provided by intentionality clocks expose additional
information to the ready_to_compute() function, by giv-
ing insight into the intentionality relation between the events.
Then, the controller computes setpoints by calling the
compute() function that uses Z, L and C as shown in
Algorithm 2. In this function, we specify how the controller
must use the logical clock and the labels in order to satisfy
the safety and optimal selection properties. First, the controller
computes the highest label of the events it has seen: C ′.
This represents the most recent events the controller has
encountered. Then, for all PAs from which the highest label
of received events is less than C ′, the controller declares a
timeout event (line 4), thereby explicitly acknowledging that it
lacks the most recent information from this PA. The controller
can then account for this missing information in the subsequent
computations. The logical clock C is set as C ′+1 to mark the
computation operation and the resulting setpoints are issued by
way of sending events with the label being the current logical
clock.
Note that, in Algorithm 2, the computation of setpoints takes
as input a set of input events comprising exactly one reception
or timeout event from each PA. This is in accordance with the
computation relation ( c−→) described in Section IV-B.
The controller is designed to be soft state [15]. When a
controller boots or reboots after a crash, its logical clock is
set to zero, and the lists Z and L are reinitialized. Thus,
it would use all subsequent reception or timeout events for
computation, because their labels would be ≥ 0. This behavior
is in accordance with the safety property, as a freshly rebooted
controller de-facto has no last setpoint sending event. However,
as described in Section V-C, these sending events would be
disregarded by the PAs as they do not reflect their most recent
state. Note that, upon booting or rebooting, the controller sends
setpoints corresponding to the initial sending events, indicated
by S0, with the label 0.
Algorithm 1: Abstract model of a controller
1 on boot or reboot
2 C ← 0; // CPS clock on this controller
3 Z← {}; // List of input events
4 S← S0; // List of setpoints to be sent
5 L← {}; // List of labels of input events
6 Issue S with label C
7 end;
8 on reception of a message m with label l from a PA i
9 Declare reception event a : (sa, i,m, l + 1);
10 Add m to Z;
11 Add a.l to L;
12 end;
13 repeat
14 decision ← ready to compute(C,Z, L);
15 if decision then
16 S, C,Z,L ← compute(C,Z,L);
17 Issue S with label C; // Sending events
18 end
19 forever;
Algorithm 2: Function: compute(C,Z,L)
1 C′ ← max(C + 3,max(L));
2 for each PA i do
3 if the maximum label in L from PA i is not equal to C′ then
4 Declare timeout event a : (sa, i,⊥, C′);
5 Add ⊥ to Z;
6 Add a.l to L;
7 end
8 end
9 C ← C′ + 1;
10 S← setpoints computed using measurements with label C′;
11 Return S, C,Z,L;
From lines 1 and 9 in Algorithm 2, we see that the logical
clock of a newly booted controller is re-synchronized with that
of the other software agents before computation, by taking the
maximum of the labels of the received measurements. This is
discussed further, in Section V-C.
C. PA Design
Algorithm 3 describes the design of a PA with intention-
ality clocks; the design complements Algorithms 1 and 2 in
satisfying the safety and optimal selection properties. Each PA
maintains a clock C that is initialized with 0 upon booting.
Upon reception of a setpoint from a controller, the PA
declares a reception event with a label one more than that
received in the message. Then, the PA compares the label of
the event with its local logical clock. If the reception event
has a higher label, then the PA implements the setpoint, else
it is discarded because it violates the safety property. In other
words, a reception event with a label less than the logical
clock of the PA means that the corresponding sending event
was not computed with the most recent state of this PA. In this
way, setpoints from delay-faulty controllers or freshly booted
controllers are not implemented, thereby upholding the safety
property.
After implementing the setpoint through an actuator, the PA
increments its logical clock to mark the computation of a new
measurement. The PA computes a new measurement through
a sensor and sends the measurement to the controller by a
sending event labeled with the current logical clock.
Each PA stores its logical clock before computing mea-
surements. When a PA recovers after a crash, it initializes
8Algorithm 3: Model of PA with causal clocks.
1 on boot
2 C ← 0;
3 end;
4 on reboot
5 C ←stored C;
6 end;
7 on reception of a message m with a label l from a controller
8 Declare reception event a : (pa, pa,m, l + 1);
9 if C < a.l then
10 C ← a.l;
11 Implement setpoint;
12 C ← C + 1;
13 Store C;
14 Compute measurement;
15 end
16 Send measurement to the controller with label C;
17 end;
its logical clock to the last stored value2. In this way, the PA
keeps track of the last state it advertised to the controller.
Controllers and PAs update their local logical clocks to
reflect the labels they observe (Algorithm 2 line 1, Algorithm
3 line 10). Notice that, upon receiving a setpoint with a label
lower than its logical clock, a PA also sends both the latest
computed measurement and the current value of the local
clock. This serves to re-synchronize the software agents that
miss some control rounds due to messages losses, crashes and
recoveries, or delays.
D. Formal Guarantees
We formally prove that our mechanism of intentionality
clocks and Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 guarantees safety and
optimal selection. The first step lies in proving that inten-
tionality clocks under our mechanism infer and describe the
intentionality relation.
Theorem V.1 (Strong Clock-Consistency). In a CPS that
implements Algorithms 1, 2, 3: for any two events a and b,
C (a) < C (b) ⇐⇒ a→ b
C (a) = C (b) and a.pa = b.pa ⇐⇒ a ≡ b
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem V.2 (Safety & Optimal Selection). A CPS that
implements Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 guarantees safety and
optimal selection.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix B.
VI. CASE STUDY: CPS FOR SCHEDULING ELECTRIC
VEHICLE CHARGING
We present, via a case study, a practical application of the
intentionality relation and the intentionality clocks mechanism.
We take the example of a CPS for scheduling the charging of a
fleet of electric vehicles (EVs), which provides a schedule that
accounts for both the vehicles’ demand and the vehicle-to-grid
regulation services [4].
2Constantly increasing counters might cause a counter overflow. However,
a 64-bit counter incremented once every millisecond takes much longer than
the lifetime of any CPS to wrap-around.
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Fig. 5. Architecture and information flow of a CPS for EV charging [4]
One of the goals of the CPS is to charge each vehicle based
on the vehicle’s demand, and the other goal is to provide fre-
quency support for the grid. Modulating the charging schedule
of the EVs, by charging at a higher or lower rate, or even
discharging into the grid for some time in cases of downward
excursion of frequency, can provide frequency support. In
practice, the EVs must respond to regulation requests every
two to four seconds [16].
The paper [4] presents a solution to the problem assuming
an ideal communication, and without considering the failure of
the software agents. However, such a mission-critical control
requires high levels of reliability in a real deployment. It is,
therefore, desirable to replicate the controller.
In Section VI-B, we use the intentionality relation to analyze
their CPS design for possible issues that could arise when the
controller is replicated. We find that a naive extension to their
design violates the optimal selection property. Consequently,
due to software and network faults, the CPS can encounter
a deadlock situation, whereby frequency support will no
longer be achieved. This might result in the instability of the
underlying electrical grid.
A. CPS Model
In this section, we analyze the system model of [4] and
show how our system model, presented in Section III, applies.
Figure 5 presents an architectural view of the system
consisting of EVs and the aggregator, as shown in [4]. It
comprises EVs that represent the controlled sub-process from
our model, the EV agents labeled 1 through n that correspond
to the PAs from our model and the central aggregator that is the
controller of the CPS. The controller receives a charging/dis-
charging (henceforth referred to as charging) schedule from
each PA, which represents the measurements in our model.
The controller computes control signals (setpoints) for each
of the EVs, using the received charging schedules.
The algorithms of the controller and PA used for achieving
the desired vehicle-to-grid regulatory service are described
in [4] in Algorithms 2A and 2B. We abstract this process
and summarize it, as shown in Algorithm 4. The controller
periodically starts an iterative process that consists of several
control rounds, subject to convergence of the algorithm. Each
iterative process is independent from the previous one, as
9if the controller had a fresh start. The triggering of a new
iterative process (line 2) is a timeout event in our model, which
further causes n sending events, one for each PA (line 4).
These represent the initial sending events as they are computed
without using measurements.
From Algorithm 4, we see that the CPS in [4] uses a
labeling scheme with label m. In Section VI-B, we show that
this labeling scheme violates optimal selection (Definition 4),
consequently the system can enter a deadlock situation. In
line 6, we see that the controller waits for schedules from
each PA before beginning computation in line 7. Thus, the
ready_to_compute() function of this CPS is the presence
of one reception event from each PA, corresponding to the
current round with label m. Timeout events do not occur
within an iteration.
In lines 7-13, we see the computation relation takes as input
one schedule from each PA and produces one control signal
for each PA. In other words, the computation relation takes
as input one reception event from each PA and outputs one
sending event for each PA. This is same as our computation
relation (Definition 2).
The iterative process (lines 5-13) continues until the control
has converged. It terminates with the sending of control and
stop signals in the setpoints of the last computation.
Each EV agent (PA) also keeps track of the on-going control
round by using the indicator m. It only accepts charging
schedules (setpoints) that belong to the current round (line
20). Upon receiving a setpoint from the current round, the PA
checks if it is accompanied with a stop signal (line 22). The
presence of a stop signal is an indication of the termination
of the iterative process and results in implementation of the
setpoint. Alternatively, when the stop signal is absent, the
PA sends its new charging schedule as a measurement to the
controller and increments m by one.
B. Deadlock due to Violation of Optimal Selection
Here, we describe a scenario in which the CPS in [4] can
enter a deadlock situation when the controller is replicated, due
to the controller replicas having different round indicators.
Consider a scenario with two replicas of the controller C1
and C2, with indicator m1 and m2, respectively. Consider a
PA, PA0 with indicator m0. Consider a situation when both
controllers sent out setpoints to PA0 with label 5. Then, m1 =
m2 = 5. PA0 receives this setpoint, implements it, sends a
measurement with label m0 = 5 and increments its indicator
to 6. Thus, after this round, we have m1 = m2 = 5 and m0 =
6. Now, if C2 does not receive the measurement from PA0
and C1 received measurements from all PAs, C1 will begin
computation and C2 will be stalled. After this computation,
we have m1 = 6 and m2 = 5. Moreover, PA0 implements the
setpoint and increments its indicator m0 to 7.
Next, let C1 crash due to a software failure and reboot.
Then, it requests for schedules with m1 = 0. However, as PA0
is expecting messages from round 7, it ignores these requests.
PA0 also discards any messages from C2, as they will have
a label 5. Moreover, C2 discards the received measurements
with label 6 because its label is m2 = 5. This is a violation of
Algorithm 4: Abstraction of the iterative process of
scheduling EV charging [4]
1 At the Aggregator (Controller)
2 repeat periodically
3 m← 0;
4 Send a request for schedules with label m to each PA;
5 repeat
6 if schedules labeled m from each PA are received then
7 Perform computation of control signals;
8 m← m+ 1;
9 if control has not converged then
10 Send new control signals with label m to each PA;
11 end
12 end
13 until control has converged;
14 Send control signals and stop signals with label m to each PA;
15 forever;
16
17 At the EV Agent (PA)
18 m← 0;
19 on reception of a control signal with label k from aggregator
20 if k == m then
21 Compute new charging schedule;
22 if stop signal received then
23 m← 0;
24 Implement charging schedule until next control signal;
25 else
26 Send schedule to aggregator with label m;
27 m← m+ 1;
28 end
29 end
30 end;
the optimal selection property by C2. Hence, the CPS enters a
deadlock state because there is no mechanism to resynchronize
the counters.
Our design (Section V) satisfies the optimal selection prop-
erty even in the presence of controller replication, and software
and network faults (as shown in Theorem V.2). Therefore, the
problem encountered by the design in [4] can be avoided by
applying intentionality clocks and tuning the design of the
software agents according to Algorithms 1, 2, and 3.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We address the problem of enabling software agents in a
CPS, namely controller and PAs, to provide a notion of rounds
of computation in presence of network losses or delays, or
replication of the controller. We show, that in such settings,
the causal (or happened-before) relation, traditionally used in
distributed systems literature, does not enable capturing the
control rounds. Instead, we introduce a new relation that we
call “intentionality relation”. We formally define this relation
for CPSs with one, possibly replicated, central controller
and one or more PAs. A possible avenue for future work
is to extend the intentionality relation to a wider range of
CPS, specifically, comprising a hierarchy of controllers, or
spontaneous sensors that send out-of-band measurements to
the controllers.
We present a clock mechanism, intentionality clocks, that
can be used to both describe and infer the intentionality
relation. We also formalize the correctness properties, namely
safety and optimal selection, that describe how the agents must
treat events in order to respect intentionality. We present the
design of a controller and a PA that guarantees the correctness
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properties. Lastly, through a case study of a real-world CPS
for charging EVs, we demonstrate the practical relevance of
the introduced concepts.
In future work, we intend to extend our design to more
generic CPSs as mentioned above. Moreover, we are currently
in the process of implementing our controller and PA design
in a CPS for real-time control of electric grids [6]. We will
study the impact of violations of the correctness properties
(safety and optimal selection) on the physical process, through
experiments in a virtual commissioning environment [17]. This
enterprise is a preparation for the deployment of the said CPS
for real-time control of a medium-voltage grid.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM V.1
In a CPS that implements Algorithms 1, 2, 3: for any two
events a and b,
C (a) < C (b) ⇐⇒ a→ b
C (a) = C (b) and a.pa = b.pa ⇐⇒ a ≡ b
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4.
Lemma A.1. a ≡ b =⇒ C (a) = C (b) and a.pa = b.pa.
Proof. If a ≡ b, then from the properties of the intentional
equivalence relation, a.pa = b.pa, and one of the following
five cases must hold:
1) a and b are initial sending events.
2) ∃ c: c n−→ a and c n−→ b
3) ∃ c, c˜: c ≡ c˜, c n−→ a, c˜ n−→ b
4) ∃ c: c c−→ a and c c−→ b
5) ∃ c, c˜: c ≡ c˜, c c−→ a, c˜ c−→ b
We prove the statement of the lemma by induction.
Base case: c, c˜ are initial sending events.
From item 1: c ≡ c˜.
From Algorithm 1, line 2: C (c) = C (c˜) = 0.
Then, c ≡ c˜ =⇒ C (c) = C (c˜).
Inductive hypothesis: C (c) = C (c˜). (For cases 2 and 4,
c = c˜ and this hypothesis holds trivially).
Inductive step: We show that the statement of the lemma also
holds for a and b.
In cases 2 and 3, by Lemma A.6:
C (a) = C (c) + 1 = C (c˜) + 1 = C (b).
In cases 4 and 5, by Lemma A.5:
C (a) = C (c) + 1 = C (c˜) + 1 = C (b).
Lemma A.2. C (a) = C (b) and a.pa = b.pa =⇒ a ≡ b.
Proof. We prove this by induction on l = C (a) = C (b).
Base case: For l = 0, a and b are initial sending events.
By rule 1 of intentionality: a.pa = b.pa =⇒ a ≡ b.
Inductive hypothesis: ∀ e, f : C (e) = C (f) = k − 1 and
e.pa = f.pa =⇒ e ≡ f .
Inductive step: We show that, ∀ a, b : C (a) = C (b) = k
and a.pa = b.pa =⇒ a ≡ b.
Case 1: a and b are input events.
By Definition 1: ∃ e, f : e n−→ a and f n−→ b.
Then, from Definition 1: e.pa = a.pa and f.pa = b.pa
Thus, e.pa = f.pa.
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By Lemma A.6: C (e) = C (a)− 1 = k − 1.
By Lemma A.6: C (f) = C (b)− 1 = k − 1.
Thus, by the inductive hypothesis: e ≡ f .
Thus, by rule 3 of intentional equivalence: a ≡ b.
Case 2: a and b are output events.
By Definition 2: ∃ g, h: g c−→ a, h c−→ b, and g.pa = h.pa.
Then, from Lemma A.5: C (g) = C (a)− 1 = k − 1.
Also, from Lemma A.5: C (h) = C (b)− 1 = k − 1.
Thus, by inductive hypothesis: g ≡ h.
Thus, by rule 5 of intentional equivalence: a ≡ b.
Case 3: a is an input event and b is an output event.
We prove that this is an impossible case.
By Definition 1: there exists an input event e, such that
e.pa = a.pa and e n−→ a.
By Definition 2: there exists an output event f , such that
f.pa = b.pa and f c−→ b.
Then, by Lemma A.6: C (e) = C (a)− 1 = k − 1.
Also, from Lemma A.5: C (f) = C (b)− 1 = k − 1.
Then, C (e) = C (f) and e.pa = f.pa.
From the induction hypothesis: e ≡ f .
By the properties of the intentional equivalence relation, e and
f are either both input events or both output events.
Contradiction.
Lemma A.3. a→ b =⇒ C (a) < C (b).
Proof. By the definition of the intentionality relation (Sec-
tion IV-D), a→ b has 5 possible cases.
Case 1: a n−→ b.
Then, by Lemma A.6: C (b) = C (a) + 1.
Thus, C (a) < C (b).
Case 2: a ≡ a˜ and a˜ n−→ b.
From Lemma A.1: a ≡ a˜ =⇒ C (a) = C (a˜).
By Lemma A.6: C (b) = C (a˜) + 1.
Thus, C (a) < C (b).
Case 3: a c−→ b
From Lemma A.5: C (b) = C (a) + 1.
Thus, C (a) < C (b).
Case 4: a ≡ a˜ and a˜ c−→ b.
From Lemma A.1, C (a) = C (a˜).
From Lemma A.5: C (b) = C (a˜) + 1.
Thus, C (a) < C (b).
Case 5: a→ c and c→ b.
From cases 1-4: C (a) < C (c) and C (c) < C (b).
Therefore, C (a) < C (b).
Lemma A.4. C (a) < C (b) =⇒ a→ b.
Proof. C (a) < C (b) =⇒ C (b) = C (a) + k, k > 0.
We prove the lemma by induction on k.
Base case: For k = 1, C (b) = C (a) + 1
Case 1: b is an input event.
By Definition 1: ∃ c : c n−→ b.
By Lemma A.6: C (b) = C (c) + 1.
Thus, C (c) = C (a).
From Lemma A.2: c ≡ a.
Hence, from rule 2 of intentionality: a→ b.
Case 2: b is an output event.
By Definition 2: ∃ c : c c−→ b.
From Lemma A.5: C (b) = C (c) + 1.
Thus, C (c) = C (a).
From Lemma A.2: c ≡ a.
Hence, from rule 4 of intentionality: a→ b.
Inductive hypothesis: Let, for some k > 1
∀ e, f : C (f) = C (e) + k =⇒ e→ f .
Inductive step: We show that
∀ a, b : C (b) = C (a) + k + 1, a→ b.
∃ c : C (b) = C (c) + 1, C (c) = C (a) + k.
From the inductive hypothesis: a→ c.
Also, from the base case: c→ b.
Therefore, from rule 5 of intentionality: a→ b.
Lemma A.5. a c−→ b =⇒ C (b) = C (a) + 1
Proof. In Algorithm 2, a is either from a reception event from
a PA with label C ′ or a timeout event with a label C ′ (line 6).
In line 8, we have C = C ′ + 1 and the sending event b has a
label C. Thus, C (b) = C (a) + 1.
In Algorithm 3, the sending event b has a label C that is
updated in lines 10 and 12. In line 10, we have C = C (a) and
in line 12, we have C = C +1. Thus, C (b) = C (a)+ 1.
Lemma A.6. a n−→ b =⇒ C (b) = C (a) + 1
Proof. At the PA
A sending event a at a controller replica occurs in line 17 of
Algorithm 1.
The corresponding reception event b at a PA occurs at line 8
of Algorithm 3.
From Algorithm 3, line 8: C (b) = C (a) + 1.
At the Controller
Algorithm 1 line 9: a reception event b has a label b.l = l+1,
where l is the label of the corresponding sending event a at a
PA (Algorithm 3, line 16).
Thus, C (b) = C (a) + 1.
Algorithm 2 line 4: we declare timeout events with label C ′,
for each PA i, such that the maximum label in L of the events
corresponding to i is different from C ′.
We trace the events that caused one such timeout event b.
Since a n−→ b, it follows that a is the sending event at a PA,
such that a.pa = b.pa, which was lost or delayed thus causing
the timeout event b.
Let g be the last sending event at a controller, such that there
exists a chain of events g n−→ f c−→ d n−→ c, where c is a
reception event at the controller on which b occurred, and
c.l = C ′. (Definitions 1 and 2).
Thus, from result of this lemma at the PA: d.l = C ′ − 1.
From Lemma A.5: f.l = C ′ − 2.
From the earlier statement at the controller: g.l = C ′ − 3.
The controller declares timeout events to acknowledge that
it lacks information from some PAs, that it has from others.
This information is the state of the sub-processes after the
implementation of the setpoints encapsulated in the last send-
ing events that resulted from the same computation relation at
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some controller replica.
Thus, from Definitions 1 and 2: there exists another chain of
events, g n−→ h c−→ a, such that h.pa = a.pa.
From result of this lemma at the PA: h.l = C ′ − 2.
From Lemma A.5: a.l = C ′ − 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM V.2
A CPS that implements Algorithms 1, 2, 3 guarantees safety
and optimal selection.
Proof. The proof has two parts: safety and optimal selection.
Safety
At the controller: Algorithm 2 line 10, the controller computes
setpoints using measurements with label C ′.
C ′ is greater than the label of the last setpoint issued at line
17 in Algorithm 1 with label C, as C ′ = max(C+3,max(L))
(Algorithm 2, line 1).
From Theorem V.1: C (b) < C (a) =⇒ b→ a.
Thus, when an event a with label C ′ is used by the controller
for computation, and another event b was the last event issued
by the controller with label C, then C ′ > C =⇒ b→ a.
At the PA: The computation at PA, i.e., implementation of a
setpoint followed by subsequent computation of a measure-
ment, is triggered only if Algorithm 3 line 9 is true.
Therefore, if an event a with label a.l is used in a computation
by a PA when its CPS causal clock is C, then C < a.l.
However, C is the label of the sending event b, corresponding
to the last measurement issued.
Therefore, by Theorem V.1: C (b) < C (a) =⇒ b→ a.
Optimal Selection
At the controller: Consider a reception event a with label a.l
at a controller, when its clock is C.
Case 1: a.l ≤ C.
Let b is a sending event corresponding to the last setpoint sent
to the same PA.
From Theorem V.1: C (a) ≤ C =⇒ b 6→ a.
From Algorithm 2 line 1, we have a.l < C + 3 < C ′.
In line 10, the controller computes with events of label C ′.
Thus, the event a is not used in computation, i.e., discarded.
Case 2: a.l > C and a.l 6= max(L).
Consider an event e such that C (e) = max(L).
From Theorem V.1: C (a) < C (e) =⇒ a→ e.
From Lemma B.1: C (a) < C (e) =⇒ C (e) > C (a) + 4.
Let d be the sending event on a PA, such that d n−→ e.
Then, C (d) = C (e)− 1.
Let c be the reception event on the PA, such that c c−→ d.
Then C (c) = C (e)− 2.
Let b be the sending event on a controller, such that b n−→ c.
Then C (b) = C (e)− 3.
Thus, C (b) > C (a).
FBy Theorem V.1: C (b) > C (a) =⇒ b 6→ a.
Hence, a must be discarded.
From Algorithm 2 line 1, we have a.l < max(L) < C ′.
In line 10, the controller computes with events of label C ′.
Thus, the event a is not used in computation, i.e., discarded.
Case 3: a.l > C and a.l = max(L)
From Lemma B.1: a.l > C + 3.
From Algorithm 2 line 1: a.l = C ′.
In line 10, the controller computes with events of label C ′.
Thus, the event a is used in computation, i.e., not discarded.
At the PA: An event a is discarded by the PA only if a.l ≤ C
(Algorithm 3, line 9), where C is the label of the event b
corresponding to the last measurement sent.
Thus, from Theorem V.1, if a is discarded, b 6→ a.
Lemma B.1. For any two events a and b occurring at the
same software agent, if a and b are both input events or both
output events, then [C (b)− C (a)] % 4 = 0.
Proof. We start by proving the statement for output events at
the controller, by using induction.
Base case: Let a be an initial sending event. Then, C (a) = 0.
Let b be an event occurring on a PA, such that a n−→ b.
Let c be a sending event on the same PA, such that b c−→ c.
Let d be an event on the controller, such that c n−→ d.
Let e be the sending event on the controller, such that d c−→ e.
Then, C (e) = 4 and [C (e)−C (a)] % 4 = 0, where e and a
are both output events. Thus, the statement is true for the first
two sending events on all controllers.
Inductive hypothesis: Consider an instance of the execution
trace at time t0 at which there is no event in the CPS b,
such that C (b) ≥ l. At this instant, let A be the set of all
sending events on all controller. Clearly, ∀a ∈ A, C (a) < l.
We assume the hypothesis be true for all a ∈ A.
Inductive step:
Consider a0 ∈ A, be such that ∀ a ∈ A, C (a0) ≥ C (a).
By the induction hypothesis: C (a0) = 4k, where k ∈ N.
We show that the hypothesis is also true for the first sending
event b that occurs at a controller after t0 such that a0 → b.
∀ c, (c.sa = PA1 ∧ a0 n−→ c) =⇒ C (c) = 4k + 1.
∀ d, (d.sa = PA1 ∧ c c−→ d) =⇒ C (d) = 4k + 2.
∀ e, (e.sa ∈ C ∧ e.pa = PA1 ∧ d n−→ e) =⇒ C (e) = 4k+3.
∀ f , (f.sa = e.sa ∧ e c−→ f) =⇒ C (f) = 4k + 4.
Thus, [C (f)− C (a0)] % 4 = 0.
f is a sending event on a controller and C (f) > C (a0).
Thus, f /∈ A.
Also, f is the first sending event that occurred after t0.
Thus, the hypothesis holds for all sending events at controllers.
Sending events at controllers have label of the form 4k.
By Lemma A.6: input events at PAs have label of the form
4k + 1.
From Algorithm 3: output events at the PAs have label of the
form 4k + 2.
By Lemma A.6: input events at the controller have label of
the form 4k + 3.
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APPENDIX C
DISCUSSION OF THEOREMS IN SECTION IV
The proofs for these theorems in the general case requires a
tedious enumeration of several cases, in a manner similar to
the one followed in the proofs of the main theorems of the
paper (Theorems V.1 and V.2). However, from the result of
Theorem V.1, these theorems can be easily shown to hold for
CPSs that implement Algorithms 1, 2, and 3.
Proof of Theorem IV.1
“Intentional equivalence” is reflexive, symmetric, transitive.
Proof. Properties (1)-(5) of the intentional equivalence relation
(Section IV-C) can be observed to be reflexive, symmetric, and
transitive. Rather than enumerate the several cases in order to
prove this, we use the results obtained in Lemmas A.1, A.2
to provide a much more concise proof.
Reflexive: Consider event a.
We have C (a) = C (a).
Therefore, by Lemma A.2: C (a) = C (a) =⇒ a ≡ a.
Symmetric: Consider events a and b, such that a ≡ b.
By Lemma A.1: a ≡ b =⇒ C (a) = C (b).
Then, C (b) = C (a).
Therefore, by Lemma A.2: C (b) = C (a) =⇒ b ≡ a.
Transitive: Consider events a, b, c, such that a ≡ b, b ≡ c.
By Lemma A.1: a ≡ b =⇒ C (a) = C (b).
By Lemma A.1: b ≡ c =⇒ C (b) = C (c).
Then, C (a) = C (c).
Therefore, by Lemma A.2: C (a) = C (c) =⇒ a ≡ c.
Proof of Theorem IV.2
For any two events a, b: a→ b =⇒ b 6→ a.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction.
Let a→ b and b→ a.
From Lemma A.4, a→ b =⇒ C (a) < C (b).
From Lemma A.4, b→ a =⇒ C (b) < C (a).
Contradiction.
Therefore, b 6→ a.
Proof of Theorem IV.3
For any two events a, b, such that a.pa = b.pa:
(a 6→ b ∧ b 6→ a) ⇐⇒ a ≡ b.
Proof. The statement has two parts.
Part 1: (a.pa = b.pa, a 6→ b) and b 6→ a =⇒ a ≡ b
From the converse of Lemma A.4: a 6→ b =⇒ C (a) ≮ C (b).
From the converse of Lemma A.4: b 6→ a =⇒ C (b) ≮ C (a).
If C (a) ≮ C (b) and C (b) ≮ C (a), then C (a) = C (b).
By Lemma A.2: (C (a) = C (b) ∧ a.pa = b.pa) =⇒ a ≡ b.
Part 2: (a.pa = b.pa and a ≡ b) =⇒ (a 6→ b and b 6→ a)
From Lemma A.1: a ≡ b =⇒ C (a) = C (b).
Thus, C (a) ≮ C (b) and C (b) ≮ C (a).
From the converse of Lemma A.3: C (a) ≮ C (b) =⇒ a 6→ b.
From the converse of Lemma A.3: C (b) ≮ C (a) =⇒ b 6→ a.
